As usual, the caveats.
Hello all. Unfortunately, I don't have time for a full post, but since I'm not using real money, I figure the only to keep myself honest is to make a record of my virtual trades as soon as they're made, so I will report the trade now and give a fuller explanation later.
This post is to report on two trades. First, Synacor (SYNC) continues to hover around $3.00 a share, well below the price I bought it at. As mentioned in my last post, I have been able to find no publicly available financial information about the company to justify this rather precipitous drop. At this point, of course, my first instinct is that I have made some kind of mistake: that everyone else knows something I don't and that I should get out before things get any worse. However, if I am trying to approach these stock trades rationally, this reaction makes very little sense. Fundamentally, I have acquired no new information about Synacor or its financial state; since my investing thesis in the original trade was that Syancor was undervalued at $3.52 a share, then rationally, I should conclude that it is even more undervalued at $3.00 a share. So, the most rational response to this price dip, in the absence of new information, is to purchase more SYNC, rather than sell what I have. So that is precisely what I have done. I (virtually) purchased 330 additional shares of SYNC at $3.00 a share, the closing price as of last night, bringing my total ownership up to 895 shares.
The other trade (which as I mentioned, I will explain in more depth later) was an investment in semiconductor chip manufacturer Volterra (VLTR). Volterra produces and sells specialized voltage regulators that deliver a consistent, reliable voltage to electronics like laptops, servers and so on. I purchased 125 shares of VLTR at 15.99 a share (last night's closing price).
That's all for now. A more in depth explanation of the Volterra trade will come soon, likely before their earnings announcement on Monday.
Friday, July 19, 2013
Monday, July 1, 2013
A Possible Opportunity?
Well, there's no denying it's been a pretty rough few weeks for the ol' virtual portfolio. Since I made my first virtual trade, the value of Synacor (SYNC) has fallen from $3.52 a share down to $3.10 a share at close on Friday. (Fortunately, the price recovered a bit today to $3.28 a share, but the portfolio is still down almost $150 from the initial captial investment.) So, not a great result for the first few weeks of investing.
Interestingly, though I have tried, I have been unable to determine what precisely drove the rather precipitous drop in Synacor's value over the last few weeks. The only real news to come out of the company was announcement of a new office in Boston back at the end of May (see here); an announcement which initially seemed to cause the stock to spike 7% in single day of trading, and which seems to speak as much to the company's growth and solidity as its weakness. It may of course just be one of those feedback loops based on little or no information which are impossible to predict. Nevertheless, it is my hope that in the future I can find better resources for determining why people are buying or selling a stock.
An interesting potential opportunity came to my attention a few days ago, one that I'm sure may already knew about and some have already dived into. As of last Friday, June 28, Rupert Murdoch's octopus like global media empire (News Corp) was spun off into two companies. The lion's share of the business remained, comprised primarily of the entertainment properties: things like 20th Century Fox, the Fox broadcast networks, Fox News, Fox Sports (excepting Australia) and so on. However, the publishing arm of the business -- including the company's newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and the The Times of London along with Harper Collins publishing and several other properties -- was spun off into a smaller independent company. Confusingly, the smaller spin-off company took on the name News Corp and stock ticker symbols (NWSA and NWSV) while the remaining company switched its name to Fox and its ticker symbols to FOXA and FOXV.
Now, after reading Greenblatt, my ears naturally prick up at the sound of the word "spin-off". So when I read about this one, I was pretty excited. After all, the new spun-off company would include the franchises carrying the stigma of the News of the World hacking scandal, which might scare off investors and keep the price down. Unfortunately while this situation does have many of the details of a desirable spinoff, it also has some things going against it. First of all, while the spinoff did create a considerably smaller company (less than 1/7 the original size by market capitalization) the original company was so large that the new News Corp is still a Fortune 500 company! So the new News Corp is hardly outside the eye of institutional investors. In addition, the movement of capital back and forth over the last few years makes it very difficult to get a handle on the likely earnings of the new News Corp, even with the Pro Forma financial statements available in the separation's Form 10 filing.
To get a stab at a fair price for the new stock, I tried using price/sales and price/operating income and comparing it with other publishing companies. According to price/sales, the price is near the lower end, but well within a standard price for a publishing company; according to price/operating income, the price of new News Corp is actually a bit high. So, despite the baseline advantages of spin-offs, it seems that the price of the new News Corp is being held up by institutional scrutiny, and thus not necessarily a terrific opportunity as yet.
Nevertheless, I'll wait and see if selling pressure pushes down the price over the next week or two. If the price were to drop down around 10 or 11, then we might have a reasonable bargain on our hand. But I doubt that's going to happen. So for now, the portfolio will stay as it is.
Interestingly, though I have tried, I have been unable to determine what precisely drove the rather precipitous drop in Synacor's value over the last few weeks. The only real news to come out of the company was announcement of a new office in Boston back at the end of May (see here); an announcement which initially seemed to cause the stock to spike 7% in single day of trading, and which seems to speak as much to the company's growth and solidity as its weakness. It may of course just be one of those feedback loops based on little or no information which are impossible to predict. Nevertheless, it is my hope that in the future I can find better resources for determining why people are buying or selling a stock.
An interesting potential opportunity came to my attention a few days ago, one that I'm sure may already knew about and some have already dived into. As of last Friday, June 28, Rupert Murdoch's octopus like global media empire (News Corp) was spun off into two companies. The lion's share of the business remained, comprised primarily of the entertainment properties: things like 20th Century Fox, the Fox broadcast networks, Fox News, Fox Sports (excepting Australia) and so on. However, the publishing arm of the business -- including the company's newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and the The Times of London along with Harper Collins publishing and several other properties -- was spun off into a smaller independent company. Confusingly, the smaller spin-off company took on the name News Corp and stock ticker symbols (NWSA and NWSV) while the remaining company switched its name to Fox and its ticker symbols to FOXA and FOXV.
Now, after reading Greenblatt, my ears naturally prick up at the sound of the word "spin-off". So when I read about this one, I was pretty excited. After all, the new spun-off company would include the franchises carrying the stigma of the News of the World hacking scandal, which might scare off investors and keep the price down. Unfortunately while this situation does have many of the details of a desirable spinoff, it also has some things going against it. First of all, while the spinoff did create a considerably smaller company (less than 1/7 the original size by market capitalization) the original company was so large that the new News Corp is still a Fortune 500 company! So the new News Corp is hardly outside the eye of institutional investors. In addition, the movement of capital back and forth over the last few years makes it very difficult to get a handle on the likely earnings of the new News Corp, even with the Pro Forma financial statements available in the separation's Form 10 filing.
To get a stab at a fair price for the new stock, I tried using price/sales and price/operating income and comparing it with other publishing companies. According to price/sales, the price is near the lower end, but well within a standard price for a publishing company; according to price/operating income, the price of new News Corp is actually a bit high. So, despite the baseline advantages of spin-offs, it seems that the price of the new News Corp is being held up by institutional scrutiny, and thus not necessarily a terrific opportunity as yet.
Nevertheless, I'll wait and see if selling pressure pushes down the price over the next week or two. If the price were to drop down around 10 or 11, then we might have a reasonable bargain on our hand. But I doubt that's going to happen. So for now, the portfolio will stay as it is.
Thursday, June 6, 2013
My First Pick: Synacor (SYNC)
Once again, the caveats.
There are still a lot of things I haven't decided about how precisely this blog is going to work: how often I post, what events warrant posts, whether I should post about stocks that I investigate but decide to leave on the table (which will likely be most of them). But one thing is certain: I definitely need to post when I decide to buy or sell. So here I am, chronicling my first (albeit virtual) trade. Unfortunately, as I have no practice organizing my thoughts about a stock, this post is likely to be somewhat rambling; so my apologies for that.
First, the basics: Synacor is a internet service company that designs and implements "TV Everywhere" solutions. Largely, they appear to be selling their services to cable companies (as well as companies offering similar services like Verizon's FiOS), so that those companies can (hopefully) make a smooth transition as more and more TV viewers seek to access TV content on the internet rather than on a broadcast schedule. This "disruptive" move to a more internet-based TV consumption model has been presaged for some time; and while cable companies haven't been put out of business (nor, in my opinion, are they likely to be), TV watching is changing, and services like HBO GO have demonstrated the effectiveness of a subscription-based TV everywhere solution.
Unfortunately, on the surface, Synacor has a lot going against it. It's a relatively new company (the IPO was only last February) and it's operating in a new and untested business. In 2012, it's annual net income dropped from $10 million to $4 million, yielding a earnings per share of only $0.14. The most recent quarter did little to improve on this, and the current P/E ratio is an unimpressive 38. Fairly few analysts have paid much attention to Synacor (not surprising, given it's $98 million market capitalization), but those who have are giving it the thoroughly uninspiring rating of "Hold". And perhaps most damning of all, Synacor's stock is far lower now that it was less than a year ago. In fact, only eleven months ago, Synacor was trading between $15 and $17 a share. Since then, SYNC has dropped like a stone, and has been stuck between $2.70 and $4.00 a share for the last couple months.
So given all these issues, why would I like Synacor? Because, in reality none of those issues are really that critical. The massive drop in stock price was not primarily driven by investors suddenly deciding the stock wasn't worth as much as it claimed to be worth; when Synacor had it's IPO, it was sold at a much more reasonable $5-6. The stock price, however, rose rapidly, seemingly driven by a group called the National Inflation Association, in an apparent pump-and-dump scheme. It seems unlikely that Synacor itself was involved in this pump-and-dump, as insiders at Synacor still own almost 6% of the company, even with it's massive stock drop.
That 6% insider ownership was one of the first things that suggested to me this company might actually be moving in the right direction. But what about the sudden drop in earnings? Well, on closer examination, that appeared to be less of a issue as well. Though EPS (earnings per share) did drop in 2012, revenue didn't. In fact, revenue in 2012 went up 33%, and stayed up in the first quarter of 2013. In fact, if you look at free cash flow rather than income, Synacor actually improved considerably in 2012, going from $7 million to $10 million. (Free cash flow is a measure of the actual money that moves in and out of the company during a period, rather than income, which is a more abstract accounting measure of increase in assets and decrease in liabilities, and includes things like depreciation, amortization and accounts receivable. Free cash flow is often a more accurate representation of a company's business health, particularly companies with large advertising revenues, even if it translates less directly into shareholder equity). And while Synacor has a fairly mediocre P/E multiple of 38, its price to free cash flow multiple is a much more appealing 15, well below the average of its peers.
Given these underlying strengths, and adding in almost zero debt, a big pile of cash (over 80% of their assests) and a market that is, one way or another, destined for growth, Synacor seems like an excellent buy. Given that I have a (virtual) $10,000 portfolio, and assuming that I don't really want to be involved with more that 4 or 5 equities at a time, I've started things off with a healthy $2000 investment in Synacor (SYNC). At last night's closing price of $3.52 a share, and factoring in an $8.95 trade fee, that gives us 565 shares of Synacor. So here is the state of the portfolio as of last night:
Check back soon to see how things go.
There are still a lot of things I haven't decided about how precisely this blog is going to work: how often I post, what events warrant posts, whether I should post about stocks that I investigate but decide to leave on the table (which will likely be most of them). But one thing is certain: I definitely need to post when I decide to buy or sell. So here I am, chronicling my first (albeit virtual) trade. Unfortunately, as I have no practice organizing my thoughts about a stock, this post is likely to be somewhat rambling; so my apologies for that.
Synacor (SYNC)
Current price (as of close, June 5, 2013): $3.52
First, the basics: Synacor is a internet service company that designs and implements "TV Everywhere" solutions. Largely, they appear to be selling their services to cable companies (as well as companies offering similar services like Verizon's FiOS), so that those companies can (hopefully) make a smooth transition as more and more TV viewers seek to access TV content on the internet rather than on a broadcast schedule. This "disruptive" move to a more internet-based TV consumption model has been presaged for some time; and while cable companies haven't been put out of business (nor, in my opinion, are they likely to be), TV watching is changing, and services like HBO GO have demonstrated the effectiveness of a subscription-based TV everywhere solution.
Unfortunately, on the surface, Synacor has a lot going against it. It's a relatively new company (the IPO was only last February) and it's operating in a new and untested business. In 2012, it's annual net income dropped from $10 million to $4 million, yielding a earnings per share of only $0.14. The most recent quarter did little to improve on this, and the current P/E ratio is an unimpressive 38. Fairly few analysts have paid much attention to Synacor (not surprising, given it's $98 million market capitalization), but those who have are giving it the thoroughly uninspiring rating of "Hold". And perhaps most damning of all, Synacor's stock is far lower now that it was less than a year ago. In fact, only eleven months ago, Synacor was trading between $15 and $17 a share. Since then, SYNC has dropped like a stone, and has been stuck between $2.70 and $4.00 a share for the last couple months.
So given all these issues, why would I like Synacor? Because, in reality none of those issues are really that critical. The massive drop in stock price was not primarily driven by investors suddenly deciding the stock wasn't worth as much as it claimed to be worth; when Synacor had it's IPO, it was sold at a much more reasonable $5-6. The stock price, however, rose rapidly, seemingly driven by a group called the National Inflation Association, in an apparent pump-and-dump scheme. It seems unlikely that Synacor itself was involved in this pump-and-dump, as insiders at Synacor still own almost 6% of the company, even with it's massive stock drop.
That 6% insider ownership was one of the first things that suggested to me this company might actually be moving in the right direction. But what about the sudden drop in earnings? Well, on closer examination, that appeared to be less of a issue as well. Though EPS (earnings per share) did drop in 2012, revenue didn't. In fact, revenue in 2012 went up 33%, and stayed up in the first quarter of 2013. In fact, if you look at free cash flow rather than income, Synacor actually improved considerably in 2012, going from $7 million to $10 million. (Free cash flow is a measure of the actual money that moves in and out of the company during a period, rather than income, which is a more abstract accounting measure of increase in assets and decrease in liabilities, and includes things like depreciation, amortization and accounts receivable. Free cash flow is often a more accurate representation of a company's business health, particularly companies with large advertising revenues, even if it translates less directly into shareholder equity). And while Synacor has a fairly mediocre P/E multiple of 38, its price to free cash flow multiple is a much more appealing 15, well below the average of its peers.
Given these underlying strengths, and adding in almost zero debt, a big pile of cash (over 80% of their assests) and a market that is, one way or another, destined for growth, Synacor seems like an excellent buy. Given that I have a (virtual) $10,000 portfolio, and assuming that I don't really want to be involved with more that 4 or 5 equities at a time, I've started things off with a healthy $2000 investment in Synacor (SYNC). At last night's closing price of $3.52 a share, and factoring in an $8.95 trade fee, that gives us 565 shares of Synacor. So here is the state of the portfolio as of last night:
| 6/05/13 | |
|---|---|
| Capital | 8002.25 |
| Synacor (SYNC) | 3.52 |
| x 565 | 1988.80 |
| Total | 9991.05 |
Check back soon to see how things go.
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
My First Lessons
As always, remember the caveats.
Last weekend, I read my way through Joseph Greenblatt's now famous investing book, "You Can Be A Stock Market Genius." In all honesty, I started with this reference because it was cited as an influence by no less than two of the three fabulously successful (if somewhat idiosyncratic) hedge funds profiled in Michael Lewis' chronicle of the financial crisis, "The Big Short." It would be hard to interpret Lewis' book as implying that reading Greenblatt was the secret of their success, but if they thought it was good, I figure it's worth a look.
The book, despite it's doofy title, and despite now being a little bit dated, is still an excellent read. I won't go into the details of his "special situations investing" advice; after all, if I did, what reason would you have to read the book? Nevertheless, perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the book is this: it is in fact possible for an intelligent, motivated personal investor with only a small amount of capital to make better than average money in the stock market. This, of course, is very counter-intuitive; if there are people far more highly trained than I, with far more experience, who were specifically hired and are specifically paid to invest in stocks (and there are), and if they drive the overall behavior of the market and the stocks within it (and they do), then how can I hope to make any money, if making money requires exploiting an inefficiency that they have ignored? His argument - an argument that I think, to some degree, still holds - is that those professional investors are not trying to make money in the same way as I am.
There is, after all, a difference between investing hundreds of millions of dollars and investing tens of thousands. A large, institutional investor can hardly invest a significant amount of his or her portfolio in a company with a market capitalization of only $500 million. Most professional investors are investing someone else's money; the only way to earn a living doing that is to invest a lot of someone else's money, and so most professional investors will deliberately avoid or altogether ignore certain types of investment opportunities, especially small ones. Nevertheless, such small opportunities may offer more than enough reward for a small, amateur investor like myself. So, in brief, there's hope for me yet.
Of course, the development of the internet since the mid-nineties when Greenblatt published his book has both increased the number of small-time personal investors and the availability of stock information about even the most micro-cap of companies. This has, undoubtedly, ironed out or at least reduced many of the market inefficiencies that Greenblatt championed. But the important point remains: a small, personal investor like myself is not competing with the big-time Wall Street professional investors. So the market is not quite as hopelessly closed off to success as it might initially seem. Which leads somewhat clumsily to ...
Last weekend, I read my way through Joseph Greenblatt's now famous investing book, "You Can Be A Stock Market Genius." In all honesty, I started with this reference because it was cited as an influence by no less than two of the three fabulously successful (if somewhat idiosyncratic) hedge funds profiled in Michael Lewis' chronicle of the financial crisis, "The Big Short." It would be hard to interpret Lewis' book as implying that reading Greenblatt was the secret of their success, but if they thought it was good, I figure it's worth a look.
The book, despite it's doofy title, and despite now being a little bit dated, is still an excellent read. I won't go into the details of his "special situations investing" advice; after all, if I did, what reason would you have to read the book? Nevertheless, perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the book is this: it is in fact possible for an intelligent, motivated personal investor with only a small amount of capital to make better than average money in the stock market. This, of course, is very counter-intuitive; if there are people far more highly trained than I, with far more experience, who were specifically hired and are specifically paid to invest in stocks (and there are), and if they drive the overall behavior of the market and the stocks within it (and they do), then how can I hope to make any money, if making money requires exploiting an inefficiency that they have ignored? His argument - an argument that I think, to some degree, still holds - is that those professional investors are not trying to make money in the same way as I am.
There is, after all, a difference between investing hundreds of millions of dollars and investing tens of thousands. A large, institutional investor can hardly invest a significant amount of his or her portfolio in a company with a market capitalization of only $500 million. Most professional investors are investing someone else's money; the only way to earn a living doing that is to invest a lot of someone else's money, and so most professional investors will deliberately avoid or altogether ignore certain types of investment opportunities, especially small ones. Nevertheless, such small opportunities may offer more than enough reward for a small, amateur investor like myself. So, in brief, there's hope for me yet.
Of course, the development of the internet since the mid-nineties when Greenblatt published his book has both increased the number of small-time personal investors and the availability of stock information about even the most micro-cap of companies. This has, undoubtedly, ironed out or at least reduced many of the market inefficiencies that Greenblatt championed. But the important point remains: a small, personal investor like myself is not competing with the big-time Wall Street professional investors. So the market is not quite as hopelessly closed off to success as it might initially seem. Which leads somewhat clumsily to ...
Saturday, May 25, 2013
The Wherefore
So, why am I here?
Not in the existential, universal, philosophical sense. Why am I here writing this blog? Basically, I was curious about the stock market. I'm not the first. I won't be the last. But I wanted to find out more about the stock market. I wanted to know if I, a humble, inexperienced stock market outsider, could even begin to comprehend the massive, grinding, whirlwind machinery that we use to gauge the blood pressure of the modern economy.
Based on the classic premise that the best way to learn about something is to get your hands dirty and try it, I resolved to try my hand at stock investing. Based on the even more basic premise that I don't have any real money, I decided to pretend to try my hand at stock investing. And so, the genesis of the Running Tally project: I will invest a virtual amount of money ($10,000) in a small set of stocks that I think are likely to grow faster than the market on average. I will simulate this $10,000 investment over 6 months, and see what happens. This blog will chronicle my investigations, my evaluations, my criteria, my decisions, and above all, all the stupid things that I get wrong. So that's it. That's why I'm here.
Let's get started. What could possibly go wrong?
Not in the existential, universal, philosophical sense. Why am I here writing this blog? Basically, I was curious about the stock market. I'm not the first. I won't be the last. But I wanted to find out more about the stock market. I wanted to know if I, a humble, inexperienced stock market outsider, could even begin to comprehend the massive, grinding, whirlwind machinery that we use to gauge the blood pressure of the modern economy.
Based on the classic premise that the best way to learn about something is to get your hands dirty and try it, I resolved to try my hand at stock investing. Based on the even more basic premise that I don't have any real money, I decided to pretend to try my hand at stock investing. And so, the genesis of the Running Tally project: I will invest a virtual amount of money ($10,000) in a small set of stocks that I think are likely to grow faster than the market on average. I will simulate this $10,000 investment over 6 months, and see what happens. This blog will chronicle my investigations, my evaluations, my criteria, my decisions, and above all, all the stupid things that I get wrong. So that's it. That's why I'm here.
Let's get started. What could possibly go wrong?
The Caveats
Okay, here are the essential caveats:
This is not an investment blog. I know, it's got discussions of earnings, and projections, and financials, and all of those doo-dads, but it isn't an investment blog. In my mind, an investment blog is a source of advice; a place for wisdom, guidance, and counseling for the wary investor who wants a second, third, or twentieth opinion. I, however, have no advice to offer. I am not an investment professional. I've barely invested anything in my life. This blog, investment-ish though it may seem, is in fact the haphazard chronicle of my personal quest to gain some semblance of an idea about what goes on in the stock market. So, please, please, please do not take anything said, graphed, semaphored or otherwise communicated here as anything resembling sound investing advice. It isn't.
In point of fact, for the time being, there isn't even any real money riding on the considerations and decisions discussed here. I will only be tracking a virtual investment, in which I have literally no real financial stake. The only thing I lose if the investment goes south is my pride.
And yes, I know that you can't comment at the bottom of my posts. This is not because I don't care what you have to say, or because I don't like criticism, or because I think I have the only valid opinion in the world. It is merely because, at my infantile stage of investment experience, if someone did have something to say to me (or if someone, God forbid, actually asked me a question) I would very likely have no idea what to say in response. I know closing comments is widely considered a cowardly and taboo act in the world of internet communication. I apologize to the internet gods who are offended. But if you really feel like you absolutely have to say something about something that I said, feel free to write about it on your blog. Or you can hack into my blog and post a picture of me in a Tinkerbell costume dancing the Macarena with Michael Dukakis and Don Knotts. Whatever you feel will protect the dignity of the internet as a forum for the free exchange of ideas.
This is not an investment blog. I know, it's got discussions of earnings, and projections, and financials, and all of those doo-dads, but it isn't an investment blog. In my mind, an investment blog is a source of advice; a place for wisdom, guidance, and counseling for the wary investor who wants a second, third, or twentieth opinion. I, however, have no advice to offer. I am not an investment professional. I've barely invested anything in my life. This blog, investment-ish though it may seem, is in fact the haphazard chronicle of my personal quest to gain some semblance of an idea about what goes on in the stock market. So, please, please, please do not take anything said, graphed, semaphored or otherwise communicated here as anything resembling sound investing advice. It isn't.
In point of fact, for the time being, there isn't even any real money riding on the considerations and decisions discussed here. I will only be tracking a virtual investment, in which I have literally no real financial stake. The only thing I lose if the investment goes south is my pride.
And yes, I know that you can't comment at the bottom of my posts. This is not because I don't care what you have to say, or because I don't like criticism, or because I think I have the only valid opinion in the world. It is merely because, at my infantile stage of investment experience, if someone did have something to say to me (or if someone, God forbid, actually asked me a question) I would very likely have no idea what to say in response. I know closing comments is widely considered a cowardly and taboo act in the world of internet communication. I apologize to the internet gods who are offended. But if you really feel like you absolutely have to say something about something that I said, feel free to write about it on your blog. Or you can hack into my blog and post a picture of me in a Tinkerbell costume dancing the Macarena with Michael Dukakis and Don Knotts. Whatever you feel will protect the dignity of the internet as a forum for the free exchange of ideas.
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